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A Peculiar Configuration 
Malta's labour topography resembles that of industrialised states, 
with a negligible agricultural segment, and a substantial industrial 
and service oriented labour force. But, apart from five modest 
gifts of nature - sun, sea, sand, salt and stone the archipelago 
is bereft of mineral or other exploitable resources. Cheated of 
economies of scale and limited by insufficient indigenous invest-
ment capital and lack of state-of-the-art, technological competence, 
the island archipelago has had to earn its keep by mainly 
advertising itself as an attractive base to others. Today's 'cargo' -
tourists, finance, pleasure craft, merchandise - has replaced the 
military strategists and colonial administrators of the not so distant 
past. Hence was born a dependence on a different interpretation 
of resourcefulness: the ingenuity, flexibility, skill and productivity 
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of the Maltese labour force for economic survival (Baldacchino, 
1993a). 
The other side of the coin is that this dependence requires to 
be complemented with an attitudinal compliance by labour to the 
promotional package. Prosperity and stability hinge crucially on 
the consent and accommodational responses of labour, both at 
the individual and the collective levels of organisation. Hence, 
there is an inbuilt concern, held by those in control of production, 
to reap a surplus and to maintain and increase the productivity 
and attraction of labour to outside sponsors. 
The above is a concern universal to all systems of production; 
hence all economic systems can be envisaged as essentially systems 
of labour control (Harrod, 1986; Baldacchino, 1988a). The concept 
of labour control is used to refer to the construction, by no means 
automatic, of labour as a viable factor of production - responding 
positively to the demands and objectives of the economic system. 
Such labour control is typically engineered via a complex pattern 
of socialization, technology and managerial strategies, motivators 
and penalties. 
Thus, while outwardly prosperous and stable, the enviable quality 
of life enjoyed by most Maltese today conceals a particular ex-
pression of labour control: A configuration between economy, 
politics and labour which I hold to be crucial to a proper and 
contextualized understanding of the practice of workers' parti-
cipation and the control of labour (Zammit & Baldacchino, 1989). 
Ensuring Labour Control 
Obtaining the required condition of labour control is rather dif-
ficult owing to the disproportionate strength of individual and 
organized labour in the Maltese economy. Any Maltese policy 
maker has to face up to a series of hard facts: Firstly, the propor-
tion of wage and salary dependents within the labour force is 
very generous: over a third of the population are wage and 
salary earners; secondly, the representation of such employees 
within labour unions is just as impressive. The implications of 
alienating even a fraction of this organised mass could be 
politically very damaging, given in particular the anxiously fine 
margin of votes separating partisan sympathies between the two 
main political parties. This would be the third hard fact. Labour, 
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the one main readily available source of wealth creation is thus 
a significant lobby both at the ballot box and behind the union 
banner. Rampant proletarianization, innate mineral poverty, neck-
to-neck bipolar democratic politics and high union densities 
combine to produce a formidable people/worker power machine. 
The same problematic had asserted itself to some extent during 
the centuries of fortress economy. In that context, loyalty was 
engineered for and by the colonising power by virtue of it becoming 
the only source of gainful employment to a rapidly expanding 
population (Baldacchino, 1988a; Zammit, 1984). Today, the political 
actors have changed but the pattern has stubbornly persisted. 
All post-independence Maltese governments have sought, perhaps 
more out of necessity than desire, to control Maltese labour covertly 
through appeasement. The tactics have included nationalistic belt-
tightening appeals, charismatic leadership, state-trade union colla-
boration, prices and incomes policy and widespread employment 
in the public and parastatal sectors. These can all be construed 
as important and viable policy instruments of 'high trust relations' 
(Fox, 1974). That is, they constitute a particular form of labour 
control which is durable because it is based on consent rather 
than coercion. Hence, it does not generate resistance, resentment 
and, subsequently, costly industrial action, an insecure investment 
climate or electoral defeat. 
Proposal 
I propose that the issue of worker participation in Malta be con-
sidered as another important tactic in the context of the appease-
ment agenda. It is a powerful form of non-coercive labour control 
which concurrently promises to create a more cooperative and 
productive labour force, and offers the opportunity of experiment-
ing with novel, social relations of production. Such a tactic was 
particularly entertained when the country's political leaders were 
faced with a very powerful trade union organisation and a not 
too certain economic future (Baldacchfno, 1988a; Zammit, 1984). 
Non-Coercive Labour Control . 
Not only is Malta's unionization rate - around 53% - easily in 
the world's top ten league for nation states today (Baldacchino, 
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1991). The largest union within the local setup - the General 
Workers' Union (GWU) - is in all probability the largest single 
trade union in the world, relatively speaking, counting within its 
ranks 11% of the total resident local population (Walls, 1989). This 
situation is probably due to the fact that trade union membership 
and recruitment is also a function of partisan political mobilisation 
whilst, at the same time, trade unions have made powerful inroads 
in public administration, manufacturing and large private market 
service establishments. Corporatist arrangements of some sort 
have in fact been in place ever and only since the setting up of 
the GWU in 1943 and the immediate astronomical increase in 
membership of this union. Over the years, these arrangements 
have included the Labour Coordination Committee (1945-49); the 
Malta Government Joint Council (1950-68); a close affinity by 
the GWU with the policies, practices and ideologies espoused by 
the Malta Labour Party (MLP) in office (1971-87); a statutory 
fusion between the GWU and the MLP (1978-92); and, most 
recently, participation on a National Economic Development 
Council, set up by the Nationalist Government in office since 1987, 
incorporating the latest incomes policy agreement initialled in 
December 1990 (Baldacchino, 1993b). 
No wonder therefore that the first recorded instance of worker 
participation in decision making in Malta had already occurred 
in the early 1950s, when port workers (hard core GWU members) 
agreed to cooperate, manage and distribute both the work load 
and the fees collected for their services. The arrangement was 
formalised by the Port Workers' Scheme of 1952 and updated by 
the Port Workers' Ordinance of 1962 (Baldacchino et aI., 1986). 
No wonder also that the most far-reaching development in worker 
participation in Malta occurred at Malta Drydocks, still the country's 
largest, if not also oldest, enterprise with 3,700 employees, 3% 
approximtely of the gainfully occupied population where levels of 
political activism and trade union consciousness reach record 
heights. 
The introduction of work~r participation at Malta Drydocks was 
incremental: German style co-determination (where equal numbers 
of directors were appointed by the GWU and Government, and 
where the Chairperson was acceptable to both) was introduced 
in 1971 soon after the MLP's electoral victory. From 1975 
onwards, the Drydocks Council started being completely elected 
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by and from the workforce with the exception of the Chairperson, 
introducing the first and only experience of full worker self-
management in Malta. Then in 1977, the first of eighteen depart-
mental level worker committees signalled a further progressive 
refinement, decentralising the decision-making machinery down 
to the shop floor level (Baldacchino et aI., 1986; Kester, 1980). In 
the early 1980s, the Council Chair started being nominated from 
among the elected council members and no longer from outside. 
Expansion ... 
The introduction of full blown worker participation at the Dry-
docks was in all probability an ad hoc solution to what appeared 
to be a vicious circle of sour industrial relations and chronic 
bankruptcy (Portelli & Zammit, 1983). Indeed, both industrial 
peace and (for a short spell) profits were dramatically restored 
within a few years. In much the same pragmatic spirit, various 
forms of participatory management were ushered in by the MLP 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. These top-down initiatives bear 
the unmistakable stamp of Dom Mintoff, former MLP leader 
(1949-84) and former Prime Minister (1955-58; 1971-84). 
While the establishment of a socialist society remained his 
foremost long-term objective, such a development could not, in 
Mintoff's mind, take place without the achievement of national 
economic self-reliance through worker self-sacrifice and higher 
productivity. Not only did worker participation capture the 
essence of the socialist project; it was a pleasant departure from 
the confrontational and economically wasteful industrial relations 
practices which had plagued the country in previous years, 
practices which threatened its uncertain prospects after the 
appointment with the fateful day of destiny - the winding down 
once and for all of the fortress economy after 31 March 1979. It 
also permitted an acceptable modus vivendi between union and 
party, justifying the collaborationist policy of the GWU as a 
cost-effective strategy which secured gains' for workers in line 
with national economic considerations. Inspired by the then re-
markable experience of the Yugoslav self-managed economy, 
Mintoff signalled the go ahead for further novel arrangements, 
particularly in areas which were comfortably organised by the 
GWU (Kester, 1980; Zammit, 1984, passim). 
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A lone worker director was appointed to each of the boards of 
various public and parastatal corporations, usually following a 
nomination by the GWU. Management committees were set up 
within eighteen state-owned manufacturing companies, as well 
as within certain civil service departments. A number of producer 
cooperatives were also established following GWU backing, to find 
or preserve employment for discharged employees. 
A number of worker sit-ins and take-overs in the private sector 
also took place, again mostly with the full backing (and, often, 
the outright instigation) of the GWU. In the late 1970s, these 
multiple initiatives across the board were being hailed as a veri-
table (perhaps hegemonic) transition to full worker self-manage-
ment: then, almost one out of every three Maltese employees 
worked in an environment which had some formally constituted 
form of worker participation in place (Bayat, 1991; Kester, 1980) . 
. , .and Degeneration 
Political and economic circumstances however precipitated starkly 
different results. The parastatal industries had run into financial 
difficulties. As a result, they were converted, fully or partly, to 
foreign or local private ownership. This meant the dismantling of 
all other than orthodox industrial relations practices. The civil 
service management committees were captured mainly by Con-
federation of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU) union activists, then 
engaged in a bitter and protracted struggle with the GWU. A 
power contest ensued between these non-GWU representatives 
and the responsible authorities, leading to a de facto winding up 
of these civil service participatory structures. 
At Malta Drydocks, economic viability did not keep pace with 
innovations in democratic management. The enterprise had to 
fall back once again on state-guaranteed finances for its financial 
flows. And worker-managed enterprises in the private sector were 
generally temporary, stop-gap affairs: they reverted back, sooner 
rather than later, to private capital or were transformed into a 
form of public, state-owned corporation (Baldacchino, 1990, p. 101). 
Thus, when the Nationalist Party assumed office in 1987, it 
inherited the residue of what had appeared to be, hardly a decade 
before, a fully fledged participatory economy in the making. The 
legacy included: Eight worker directors on the boards of eight 
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separate corporations (seven of which was state-owned); a self-
managed Malta Drydocks which had reverted to chronic loss 
making in 1982; and three producer cooperatives (two of which 
were in the process of liquidation). 
An Assessment 
A sober assessment can be made today with the powerful advan-
tage of hindsight. The so-called transition to industrial democracy 
in Malta was, not unexpectedly, introduced from above with the 
backing and inspiration of the Maltese Labour Movement - the 
MLP and the GWU. Perhaps because of this all too transparent 
partisan packaging, it was inevitably met with suspicion and 
disapproval by the civil service rank and file: moves to greater 
democracy in action were perceived (perhaps even construed?) as 
a threat to established non-GWU trade union interests and 
power relations. The transition moreover remained subordinate 
to economic considerations where international investment was 
involved. All in all, rather than having a spillover, expansionary 
and transformative effect - as was espoused by enthusiastic pro-
gressive academics and as evidenced from policy rhetoric - the 
outcome of the participatory experience, rather than an ambitious 
transition, can now be more aptly described as a corporatist and 
integrative strategy (Stephens, 1980). 
Post 1987 
Worker participation initiatives have taken an altogether different 
cast since 1987. Malta Drydocks and its militant employees (a 
headache for any party in power) have been placed in suspended 
animation with a multi-million, 10-year package deal (D.O.I., 
1989); the number of worker-directors has not increased, though all 
directors which still exist are now in office on the basis of a free 
election. The pressure for innovative work relations, threatening to 
control other than through ownership, appears spent, a victim of 
passing fashion. Enticing more foreign investment has meant a 
more obvious policy orientation towards a stronger integration of 
the Maltese economy with satellite status into the capitalist world 
system (e.g. Camilleri, 1990). There is no urgency to experiment 
with participatory schemes: although an ongoing public sector 
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reform may be disposed to consider schemes which encourage 
autonomous work groups. Public employees enjoying security of 
tenure may also be allowed the space to self-manage specific 
projects awarded under competitive tendering (Parliamentary 
Secretariat for Human Resources, 1993). The CMTU, organising 
practically all workers not unionised within the GWU, has yet to 
press for its first worker director. The few developments to speak 
of, have been limited to experiences of partial employee share-
holding, isolated profit sharing and the setting up of a few new 
producer cooperatives. These initiatives in no way threaten 
established power relations and in more ways than one actually 
consolidate the premise that only who owns, controls the 
predicament of work. 
Nonetheless, this does not imply a regression to traditional in-
dustrial relations: Both the GWU and the CMTU have persevered, 
albeit with fits and starts, for three years, in an incomes policy 
accord with the other social partners, these being employers, 
Government and business interests. The inbuilt pressures 
towards corporatism remain; but these are today confined almost 
exclusively to superstructural arrangements. Their activation is 
far removed from the actual work environment. 
Reinventing the Wheel 
The retrenchment of trade unions away from the important arena 
of 'shop floor participation' may permit discourse on new forms of 
worker participation schemes, this time employer and manage-
ment driven, to gain popularity. We have of late in Malta turned 
the spotlight on worker empowerment, job enlargement, quality 
circles, excellence teams and other devices intended towards the 
spectacular unleashing of the worker's innate potential, the human 
resource development of individuals and groups. The promises of 
effective worker participation are being reproposed and, in the 
process, repossessed. The discourse is now different. This 'inno-
vative management approach' (BASE, 1993) is now advertised 
without the terminology which elicits threatening images of 
worker control, employee take overs, nationalisations and other 
communist chimeras now consigned to history. 
We have so admirably reinvented the wheel: Workers have been 
rediscovered as 'partners' in the production process. Worker 
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participation... oops! sorry; I mean employee commitment and 
involvement, is now a management slogan, exhorting employees 
to collaborate with the enterprise goals. The invasion of human 
capital theory into industrial relations is the new exciting issue. 
Labour has been upgraded almost overnight from ~nother factor 
input, an energy pack, to a veritable resource, where the human 
factor, and all hislher assorted faculties, are now hailed as indis-
pensable assets to organisational success (e.g. Barbara, 1990). 
Will this shift fuel a genuine (albeit often inadvertent) democrati-
sation of power relations at the workplace? Or will it contribute 
to the 'participation strip-tease', systematically robbing workers 
of job security, minimum wage legislation, trade union repre-
sentation and other gains which they have secured over many 
decades of mobilisation and collective action (Kester, 1991)? 
Enter the Worker 
But where is the worker in all this? Accounts of the Maltese 
participatory saga are too easily subsumed under the predeter-
mined principles and objectives of econometric modelling and of 
powerful mass interest groups: trade unions, political parties, 
lay and religious pressure groups, civil bureaucracies, state, 
employer and business interests. All these remain important 
players and spokespersons within the project and they invariably 
dominate and mould the rampant discourse in accordance with a 
priori motives and ambitions. Every interest group seeks to 
make its voice heard; but the voices of the actors who perhaps 
matter most - those of the individual employees concerned -
may be lost within the overall roar of confused noises. 
This observation is a critique also of mainstream academic 
accounts of labour relations and trade union studies which do 
not dislodge themselves from the institutional paradigm. They 
remain narrow domains and avowedly technicist in orientation, 
failing to consider workers as other than members of collectivities: 
unions, social classes, party machines and other organisations 
(Cohen, 1991). Workers are considered as having neither an 
existence nor a will outside such boundaries; as if they never 
question the motives and declarations of the organisations 
within which they are enrolled. 
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Worker Perceptions 
Some insights into the opinions and perceptions of Maltese workers 
on their participatory experience are at hand;, thanks to the social 
science survey research pioneered by Gerard Kester (Kester, 1974) 
and subsequently by the Workers' Participation Development 
Centre (WPDC) at the University of Malta. Having been closely 
associated with most of these research projects, I shall hereunder 
endeavour to encapsulate the dominant worker perceptions which 
have emerged to date concerning the phenomenon of worker parti-
cipation in Malta. The aim is to tease out the main sociological 
strands to the issue, enabling an appraisal of the impact of the 
experiences. 
a. Malta Drydocks Employees 
Pride of place must definitely be assigned to Malta Drydocks 
employees. They remain the most intensely studied research 
population on this theme locally. In the most ambitious survey 
conducted on this topic so far in Malta, a representative sample 
of these employees have exposed a vision of cooperation, joint 
effort and internal harmony which is embodied in their working 
definition of participation. They envisage a scenario where 
Council, professional management, the GWU and the worker 
committees cooperate in the process of decision making when no 
differences of interest are at hand. The workforce appears 
generally satisfied with the participatory system and this overall 
satisfaction finds vent in positive attitudes with respect to other 
aspects of work. The development of 'social objectification', mean-
ing a proper participatory culture and consciousness (Bernstein, 
1976; Kester, 1980), is evidenced by strong demands for further 
power sharing and for a wider spread of information. 
A number of exogenous factors colour the workers' perceptions 
of the work environment. The economic crisis infesting the ship-
repair industry generates a concern for job security, increasing 
effort and calls for greater efficiency. Social inequalities perceived 
to exist in the wider Maltese society tend to generate feelings of 
relative deprivation among the employees in relation to privileged 
social groupings. Finally, partisan politics is cited as another 
influential variable which acts both to create in-group inter-
personal bonds and out-group hostility. 
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But perhaps the most powerful external variable influencing 
the Drydocks worker's frame of mind is a cultural one. A long 
colonial experience has led, inter alia, to the emergence of 
irresponsible trade union and political activism. Antagonism is 
thus a natural perceptual framework, further supported by the 
often unexpressed radical notion that different social groups 
have fundamentally irreconcilable and conflicting interests. 
Drydocks workers have after all formed the vanguard to this 
spirit of opposition and they owe their privileged position as a 
local 'aristocracy of labour' partly to the benefits accruing from 
such a historically sustained stance (Baldacchino et aI., 1986; 
Baldacchino, 1984). 
Such a long tradition, which has paid hefty dividends, is not 
easily curtailed, let alone replaced. From the trade union 
standpoint, this antagonistic perspective persists even more 
strongly because collective bargaining is the incarnation of 
antagonism. It remains the dominant instrument for negotiating 
conditions of work in local private industry. This means that both 
the workers and their union officials are bound to feel ill at ease 
in adopting the requirements of full worker self-management: 
accepting responsibility for decisions taken, concerning them-
selves with the viability and profitability of the firm, developing 
long-term expectations and goals, possibly accompanied by short-
run sacrifices. Hence one comes across, for example, an ambivalent 
situation with regards to wages policy: relatively high, secure 
and fixed wage rates in a self-managed firm operating with chronic 
non-profitability (Baldacchino, 1989); a belief in the advantage of 
reverting to state management; a professional management which 
appears to be an uncomfortable bedfellow with the operant parti-
cipatory structures (Portelli & Baldacchino, 1988; Smole-Grobovsek, 
1986); a desire for a militant shop steward; substantial pressure for 
an equally militant, trade unionistic worker committee, which finds 
its extreme form when this committee is controlled by GWU shop 
stewards (Kester, 1986). 
A stylistically elegant way of taking stock of this situation is to 
argue that there are two systems of decision making in place, 
based on two opposing sets of principles: one participative and 
one traditional (e.g. Baldacchino, 1984; Kester, 1986). But a more 
rational explanation can perhaps be based on the notion of the 
existence of an ambiguous multiplicity of channels, a 'polycentric 
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decision making structure' which can be manipulated differently 
by different workers (or by the same workers at different times) 
at will, all in the obvious pursuit of personal, interest satisfaction 
(Smole-Grobovsek, 1986). The condition is thus not so much one 
of role conflict but one of role diffusion and role confusion (ibid.). 
This "identity crisis" may prove convenient and indeed functional 
to those intent on manipulation (Baldacchino et aI., 1986). The 
issue is not to determine whether the participatory system at the 
Drydocks is subsumed within the traditional us-them, capital-labour 
dualism, or vice versa. Rather, both of these may be subsumed and 
deftly assimilated within a culturally comfortable behaviour pattern 
which cultivates 'networks, manipulators and coalitions' (Boissevain, 
1974). Within this framework, an immediate superordinate, a union 
steward and a worker committee member 'are equal potential 
candidates for patronage and social brokerage' (Baldacchino, 1994). 
h. Worker Directors 
Interestingly, a similar set of difficulties can be documented in a 
brief survey of the opinions and experiences of worker directors 
(Baldacchino, 1988b). The worker director owes hislher existence 
to a willingness, on the part of the GWU, to experiment with the 
appointment of representatives in this capacity in the mid-1970s 
(Zammit & Baldacchino, 1989). The status of the worker-director 
is, since 1987, based on an open franchise; but an indication of 
the crucial backing of the GWU is provided by the union's success 
in getting its nominee elected in every contest to date. The trade 
union support for the position may however prove to be its own 
undoing because it generates pressure on the candidate to behave, 
once in office, like a glorified shop steward. One ought to keep in 
mind that the electorate is primarily composed of union members 
and that the candidate usually already has. a history of union 
activism. The invasion of the sanctity of the boardroom by rowdy 
trade union demands would naturally drive the other, non-elected 
board members to take corrective and defensive action, possibly 
isolating the worker representative still further. The latter's 
relative incapacity to act effectively.is sealed by the absence of 
any adequate legal, institutional or educational machinery which 
somehow defines the specific terms of reference and equips him/ 
her for the task at hand. The condition spirals precariously towards 
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oppositional trade unionism, domesticated collaborationism or else 
to a 'board with a board' situation which leaves the worker director 
in a policy limbo; the seat of decision making being stealthily 
moved away from hislher influence. 
c. Private Sector Employees 
My third and final example of participation as experienced by 
the grass roots is drawn from a case study of worker perceptions 
in a medium sized private firm. Since the fieldwork was confiden-
tial and the company is an ongoing concern, its identity had best 
remain undisclosed. 
The flirtation with workplace democracy was once again a top-
down initiative. The recommendation was made by the company's 
executive director (a priest) who suggested introducing worker 
participation in management and profits on the agenda of a 
collective agreement which was being finalised. There was some 
enthusiasm, even concern, on the part of the workers, to start 
profit participation; but the eagerness cooled down dramatically 
when the company accounts revealed a series of regular losses. 
The proposal to set up a workers' committee, eventually paving 
the way to worker directors on the company board, took off with 
good intentions. There were, however, two hitches. On the one 
hand, the dominant personality of the executive director proved 
too difficult to live with. As the founder, ideator and manager of 
the company, he exercises paternalistic management with 
employees, most of whom he knows personally and intimately; 
he remains the hub and fulcrum of most human interactions 
within the company, on business as well as private matters. On 
the other hand, the incumbents of the participatory structures 
could not (perhaps did not want to) break this 'small firm manage-
ment syndrome'; this was, from the workers' point of view, 
convenient because it spared them the burden of responsibilities 
and duties they had been obliged to accept by virtue of being 
shop floor representatives. When in this capacity, they had felt it 
their duty to come up with welfarist demands - fans, air 
conditioners, wage increases - which were summarily dismissed 
as impossible by the director. The agenda was strictly trade 
unionistic, the elected committee effectively replacing the trade 
union as the mouthpiece for worker demands. Lack of progress 
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reduced the relevance and interest in the participatory structures 
by all concerned. Participatory structures in session became use-
less, chat encounters. 'Social objectification' had not materialized. 
The participatory initiative was allowed to fold up after a year or 
so, the exasperated director refusing to continue what had become 
merely an institutionalised, time-consuming farce. 
The Politics of Discourse 
Despite a long history of armchair theorisation, and an almost 
equally long experience of assorted practices, we must humbly 
recognize that the term workers' participation is highly ambiguous 
(Bayat, 1991; Roca & Retour, 1981). The concept has implications 
for workplace humanization, social justice, equity, industrial 
peace, worker flexibility and dignity, social partnership, self-
discipline, economic efficiency and productivity boosts. It is 
precisely its amenability to all shades of ideology and intent that 
has allowed, in different conditions, the most disparate of 
interest groups to jockey for pride of place as standard-bearers of 
participation, seeking to enslave the concept and define it 
rigorously with a particular slant. As with the proverbial Indian 
fable, we are all touching the elephant. But, blinded by ideology, 
tradition, culture or pure self-interest, we prefer to point our 
finger at different attributes: The thick skin of worker self-
management; the supple proboscis of worker empowerment; the 
ivory tusk of employee share ownership; the hairy ear of co-
determination; the dangling tail of profit sharing. 
A Strategy of Avoidance? 
It seems that the complimentarity and interlocking nature of 
roles in a participatory situation has remained just as vague in 
Malta. Individual actors and powerful organisations have found 
themselves adrift in uncharted waters as they sought to fashion 
an alternative industrial relations system piecemeal. Admittedly, 
this was carried out in a pragmatic and unassuming manner 
which may have nipped in the bud significant resistance from 
established interest groups, as well as tapping generous popular 
support. Still, it left participatory initiatives amiss of a consistent 
ideology (Kester, 1980, Chap. 9). So while the pressure to participate 
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somehow remains, the organisations involved seem today much 
more disposed to do so in non-threatening, role comfortable ways: 
Labour control is understood in terms of union (rather than 
worker) participation, aloof and far removed from individual 
worker concerns and expectations which could get out of hand, 
which could rock established practices and power demarcations, 
which could scare foreign capital. It is as if, on the basis of local 
experiences, there is a definite clampdown to prevent a snow-
balling of exorbitant demands: participation in profits without 
participation in losses; participation in rights but not in duties; 
options for short-run concessions without long-run considerations. 
The absence of explicit policy measures directed towards building a 
direct relationship between effort and reward, along with the 
absence of supportive legal, educational and cultural baggage 
both undermine participative dynamics. These degenerate from 
potential mobilization and democratization to a socialization into 
traditional, defensive trade unionistic practices or else integrative 
managerial ploys. Simply put, more of the same. 
The Challenge of Managerial Initiatives 
But what about the challenge being posed to trade unions by 
employer and management initiatives in the participatory domain? 
If properly worked out, quality circles, excellence teams and 
other group-based participatory structures can be strengthened 
and legitimized with active trade union backing. Their agendas 
can be extended to incorporate other areas of competence - such 
as worker education, environmental protection, occupational 
health and safety and perhaps other issues so far viciously 
defended as sole managerial prerogatives (Kester & Pinaud, 
1992; Baldacchino, 1993c). Such programmes appear to stand a 
better chance of success (whether measured by worker, labour or 
capital yardsticks) because they are based on a set of clearer 
provisos: both the trade union and professional management 
maintain their traditional checks and functions. Meanwhile, 
deterrents and joint stake-holding interests will minimise the 
likelihood that one of these parties will deploy the participatory 
organs to override or silence the other. These organs are also 
politically non-partisan and concern the rank and file employees. 
They can therefore be much closer to the experiential domain of 
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the workers who matter than other legalistic arrangements 
located somewhere aloof and far away in the institutionalised 
labour relations architecture. 
The lessons of the past, at home and abroad, suggest that 
participation ought not to be envisaged as in lieu of traditional 
trade unionism. This either erodes professional managerial 
authority or else questions the very legitimacy of trade 
unionism. A powerful organisation to represent workers at the 
level of the firm, and a professional team driven by market logic 
and enterprise loyalties are both essential prerequisites. The 
participatory organs need to be juxtaposed next to these, rather 
than replacing anyone to the presumed tactical advantage of the 
other. Perhaps crucially, both for the trade union and the company, 
such worker participation schemes could mean survival in 
today's pragmatically driven and economically competitive world. 
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